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IDEAS. INFLUENCE. IMPACT.
Two important issues are testing relations between the 
United States and its allies in the Gulf: democratic transitions 
in the Arab world and regional security. Their outcome will 
either strengthen or disrupt what has been a long-term 
partnership. The United States and its Gulf allies are well into 
their second year of reacting to, and attempting to influence, 
the rapid political change in the Middle East and North Africa, 
but their efforts are informed by differing motivations. 
Meanwhile the looming threat of Iran attaining nuclear 
weapons has brought greater urgency to efforts to enhance 
Gulf security, but also some disquiet in the Gulf about any 
possible US deal with Iran that would serve global 
non-proliferation interests but threaten their vital regional 
security interests. 
Given that the process of change in the region is likely to be 
prolonged and difficult, the following questions merit 
continuing review: 
•	 How do the United States and the Gulf state 
governments perceive what is happening in the Arab 
states undergoing profound change: Tunisia, Libya, 
Yemen, Syria, and particularly (because of its scale and 
importance) Egypt? How do our differing views of the 
situation influence our willingness to support democratic 
change and economic stability in the 
transitioning countries? 
•	 How do the United States and Gulf countries perceive 
the security environment in the region, and how can 
cooperation be improved to protect long-term 
security interests?
•	 Are there sufficient common denominators to sustain the 
partnership between the Gulf states and the United 
States? Will they be able to build on areas of agreement 
and manage areas of difference to effectively address 
security, economic, and political challenges and to avoid 
unproductive competition for influence? 
The Trust Deficit Between Gulf 
Partners and the United States
The United States and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) share vital interests. In addition to core mutual 
defense needs, the Gulf is a major market for US exporters 
and remains an important source of petroleum. Yet the 
shared political, security, and commercial interests of the Gulf 
states and the United States have not translated into the 
deep mutual trust that form the basis of long-term alliances. 
Such trust is undercut by a US perspective dominated by 
ill-informed views of the Gulf states, often failing to distinguish 
one from another, worrying primarily about the export of 
Islamic extremism and terrorism from the Gulf region, and 
critical of non-representative governance structures and 
treatment of women and minorities within their borders.
Many interlocutors in the Gulf see the United States as a 
necessary but unpredictable and unreliable partner. Gulf 
leaders believe that the United States has failed to deliver on 
the central issue of peace between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, view the Iraq war as a disaster for their interests, and 
chafe at constantly being asked to be the ATM for projects 
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devised in Western capitals. They were stunned by the 
abrupt manner in which the United States appeared to 
abandon former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a 
long-time ally, and some are convinced that the United States 
is deeply naive about the intentions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. These differences do not preclude deep 
military and intelligence cooperation, but the trust deficit is 
not far below the surface and has been most evident in 
differences between the US and Gulf reaction to the systemic 
changes in Egypt, and to a lesser extent in Tunisia and Libya. 
The undercurrent of distrust is not simply an elite 
phenomenon: a 2011 poll found that 71 percent of Saudi 
respondents and 87 percent of Emiratis surveyed disagreed 
with the assertion that “the United States contributes to 
peace and stability in the Arab world.”1 
Democratic Transitions:  
opportunity or Threat?
The United States and its Gulf allies are still adjusting to 
continually evolving Arab transitions. Predictability and 
stability were the hallmarks of the regimes of Zine el-Abidine 
Ben Ali and Mubarak. External actors, so accustomed to the 
stagnation of the political system in Egypt, for example, now 
have difficulty processing the rate of change. The United 
States has taken what it considers a practical approach to 
the political developments based on the view that the 
previous regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya failed to 
respond to demands for economic opportunity, freedom, 
individual dignity, and inclusive prosperity. At the Manama 
Dialogue in December 2012, US Deputy Secretary of State 
William Burns called for “continued support for political 
openness, democratic reforms, and successful post-
revolutionary transitions,” with long-term stability and security 
depending upon full participation by all citizens in the political 
and economic life of their countries. He also noted that 
successful political transition and democratic reform require 
“a sense of economic possibility.”
The focus of US actions is assistance to spur economic 
growth on the premise that the situation will stabilize and 
improve only when the economic aspirations of the huge 
youth populations in the transition countries are met. This has 
translated into US decisions to deemphasize stark 
differences with the philosophy and policies of the Muslim 
Brothers, for example, and to work with the elected bodies 
and governments, which presumably will be judged by future 
elections. When revolutions turn bloody, the policy is more 
situational; contrast the robust NATO support for the Libyan 
revolt with the meager support for the Syrian resistance. 
Many in the Gulf states do not share the United States’ 
qualified equanimity for the rapid change that has occurred, 
and in particular, the sudden growth in the power and 
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Speaking with the 
author, one Saudi academic labeled the changes a “triumph 
of liberalism without liberals,” and many in the Gulf view the 
instability in the transition states as directly under-cutting their 
own stability. Elites in some Gulf countries view the Muslim 
Brotherhood as an existential threat; this is particularly the 
case in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where dozens of 
members of a Brotherhood affiliate, al-Islah, have been 
arrested. UAE officials portray virtually any kind of Islamist 
organizing as a danger not only to itself but also to other Gulf 
states, for example, stating that protests in Kuwait indicated a 
“coordinated plot spurred by the Arab Spring events.”2 An 
Emirati academic recently provided a pointed critique of 
Washington’s naiveté, labeling US policy toward the 
Brotherhood “pathetically opportunistic.”3 Evoking the 
legendary Egyptian singer, another UAE analyst called the 
Egyptian Brotherhood the “new Umm Kulthum, who will sing 
the song of Islamism to the whole region.” Saudi and Kuwaiti 
leadership, although not so vocal, strongly share the view 
that the Brotherhood is not to be trusted. The outlier is Qatar, 
whose leadership has long cultivated ties with a broad range 
of Islamists including those affiliated with the Brotherhood 
and Hamas. for Qatar, the ascent of Islamists to political 
power in the region through elections represents a new 
opportunity for the small Gulf state to exert influence through 
its financial and ideological support. 
Some Gulf states have also supported Salafi groups in the 
transitioning countries through both official and unofficial 
channels. Such support for Salafists is, in part, motivated by 
a desire to mitigate the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.4 
Salafist groups such as the Nusra front in Syria (which the 
1 John Zogby and Zogby International, Arab Attitudes, 2011, (Washington, DC: Arab American Institute foundation), p. 4.
2 The Khaleej Times, “UAE slams foreign designs on GCC,” http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/nationgeneral/2012/
October/nationgeneral_October479.xml&section=nationgeneral.
3 Gulf News, “US, Islamists and Arab Gulf States,” http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/us-islamists-and-arab-gulf-states-1.1110379.
4 See Project on Middle East Political Science, Arab Uprisings: The New Salafi Politics, October 16, 2012 for several papers on current Salafi movements.
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United States designated a terrorist organization in 
December 2012) and Ansar al Sharia in Libya have almost 
certainly benefited from Gulf help. At the time of the Egyptian 
presidential election it was widely believed (but not 
confirmed) that Salafi parties, which won one-quarter of 
parliamentary seats despite their lack of prior political 
experience, would not have seen such success had they not 
been able to spread largesse in poor communities with 
substantial Qatari and/or Saudi support. The attacks on US 
personnel and facilities in Libya and Tunisia are believed to 
have been the work of violent Salafist elements, bringing into 
stark relief US and Gulf differences over support for 
such groups. 
The Gulf states’ largely defensive approach to democratic 
change was also evident in the dispatch of security forces 
from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to Bahrain to protect the 
Sunni Al-Khalifa family in the face of widespread unrest 
among the majority Shia population in 2011. The Saudis were 
determined to prevent spillover into their own Shia-populated 
Eastern Province. The Bahraini ruling family and their patrons 
in riyadh accused Iran of stirring the pot, labeling Bahraini 
protestors as Iranian agents—a version of events that, 
however poorly backed by facts, is often repeated in the Gulf. 
The United States accepts that Iran is trying to influence 
events in Bahrain, but gives far more weight to domestic 
factors in assessing the causes of the internal conflict.
Democracy Not for Us
Where the United States and European allies see the Arab 
transitions as generally positive change that must be 
nurtured, the Gulf states see threats. This clash of views on 
the merits of the Arab awakening influences the level of 
enthusiasm to help the new democracies succeed and 
shapes the motivations to provide material support to 
governments and their political rivals. 
Leaders in the Gulf believe that multi-party democracy is 
incompatible with the survival of their monarchies. Although 
the leadership in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman 
do not expend much effort explaining their political vision, the 
UAE and Qatar have embarked on national branding 
campaigns that have thrust them onto the world stage, 
embracing globalization and modernity while rejecting most 
forms of political expression and participation as inconsistent, 
and even unnecessary, for their societies. One Qatari analyst 
suggested to the author that the UAE and Qatar have 
leap-frogged democracy to reach a new model of good 
governance that better responds to their citizens’ needs 
and demands. 
Bubbling under the surface in the Gulf, however, is a nagging 
and growing uncertainty about the relevance and durability of 
modern monarchies. royal families see a threat in young 
people who employ social media to mobilize protests and 
establish a new channel of political expression that pays little 
heed to the Gulf’s traditions of limited and hierarchical 
political discourse. Yet one Gulf businessman admitted 
privately that despite efforts by some Gulf states to curtail the 
role of social media, there is no effective immunization 
against the broad trend of greater political engagement 
and participation. 
Hurry Up Versus Wait and See
The international community has thus far provided modest 
levels of economic support to the Arab countries in transition. 
The amounts pledged fall far short of the generous support 
for the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. US and European leaders 
assert that economic aspirations, especially those of the 
young and unemployed, need to be addressed quickly or 
less palatable political alternatives will emerge to replace the 
fledgling democracies, or worse, they could become 
failed states.
Gulf donors have promised significant sums and helped 
stabilize the Egyptian pound by making loans to the Egyptian 
Central Bank, but they are motivated not by an interest in 
supporting young democracies but rather by their own 
political and economic interests. To this end, they have 
adopted a “wait and see” attitude toward the new leaders in 
Egypt and Tunisia before committing significant additional 
funds, for example, and seem not to sense any urgency in 
making such decisions. Saudi Arabia has made pledges as 
part of the Deauville Partnership established by the G-8 and 
supported the recently-established Transition fund,5 but in 
general the Gulf states have been unenthusiastic about 
multilateral efforts. An Emirati businessman commented 
off-the-record that the Gulf contributors want to ensure they 
receive “credit” for support they provide, and the multilateral 
initiatives seem to diffuse such recognition.
5 See Atlantic Council report “Arab Awakening: Are the US and EU Missing the Challenge?” by Danya Greenfield and rosa Balfour, June 2012, for more details on 
the Deauville Partnership and the problems of mobilizing foreign assistance.  
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Gulf donors and investors also recognize that prospects for 
effective use of aid and investment capital are weak as long 
as the business climate in the transition states is 
characterized by a lack of clear rules, non-payment of 
commercial debts, lack of respect for contracts, and 
prosecution of prominent business people. They ask, “why 
would we invest in Egypt if Egyptians don’t have the 
confidence to invest themselves?” 
Nonetheless, the economic challenges in the transition 
countries are increasing, and some Gulf business people 
recognize the destabilizing potential of a huge cadre of 
unemployed. Among some in the business community there 
is also a sense of responsibility or obligation to help their Arab 
brethren in Egypt or Jordan through their financial crises. One 
businessman told the author that a portion of oil profits 
resulting from price jumps during the Egyptian revolt should 
Egypt
Kuwait
PLEDGED:  Kuwait fund for Arab Economic Development loan portfolio in Egypt is $1.6 billion.
– $820 million loan to finance Benha power station, December 2012. 
– $102 million loan to finance Helwan power station project. received first $60 million, September 2012.
– $88 million loan to finance construction of 750 megawatt power plant north of Cairo, May 2012.
– $60 million loan to assist with gas network, July 2012. Awaiting Egyptian approval.
– $2.2 million in technical assistance for railway-related projects, May 2012. 
Qatar
RECEIVED: $2 billion deposited in central bank and granted $500 million, December 2012. 
PLEDGED:   $2.5 billion (in addition to the $2.5 billion already received), January 2013. 
PLEDGED:   $18 billion in investment over the next 5 years, September 2012.
Saudi Arabia
PLEDGED:   $4 billion, May 2011. 
– $1.5 billion (deposited) to support central bank reserves, June 2012.
– $500 million for development projects, May 2012. 
– $250 million to finance purchases of petroleum products, June 2012. 
– $200 million support for SMEs, June 2012. 
– $750 million line of credit for Treasury bill purchase, May 2011.
TRANSFERRED: 48,000 tons of liquefied gas, february 2012.
TRANSFERRED: $550,000 to World food Program for food aid and education, June 2012.
PLEDGED:   Saudi Development fund pledged $1.5 billion to Egyptian government, November 2012.
– $230 million loan to finance three development projects as part of $500 million package, December 2012. 
– $500 million for Treasury bill purchase, May 2012.
UAE
PLEDGED:   $3 billion, June 2011. 
– $1.5 billion support for SMEs.
– $750 million for infrastructure/housing projects.
– $750 million in soft loans.
PLEDGED:   $42 million to Cairo’s Al Azhar University to fund development projects, July 2012.
Libya
Kuwait TRANSFERRED: $180 million to National Transitional Council, April 2012.
Qatar
PLEDGED:   $400-500 million to National Transitional Council, May 2012.
National Transitional Council head Mustafa Abdul Jalil said Qatar spent more than $2 billion on the Libyan 
revolution, August 2012.
Tunisia
Qatar
PLEDGED:  $1 billion loan, April 2012.
TRANSFERRED: $500 million deposit in central bank, April 2012.
PLEDGED:  $2 billion investment in an oil refinery, May 2012.
PLEDGED:  20,000 jobs to unemployed Tunisian graduates, April 2012.
Saudi Arabia
PLEDGED:  $750 million, June 2011. No funds transferred to date. 
PLEDGED:  Saudi fund for Development pledged $220 million for three loans (one for a power station, one for  
 investment in gas transport, and one for vocational training), July 2012.
UAE
TRANSFERRED: $200 million to revive the health system, June 2012.  
TRANSFERRED: Abu Dhabi fund for Development granted a $4.3 million loan (for Tunisia and Somalia),  
   beginning of 2012.
Official Aid and Loans from Gulf Countries to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia 
(as of January 2013)
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be deployed by Gulf donors to support infrastructure projects 
in Egypt and elsewhere to provide jobs. 
Looking ahead, a number of variables will influence how the 
Gulf and the United States react and offer support to Arab 
countries in transition. In the United States, a key factor will 
be the attitude of the newly-elected Congress toward foreign 
assistance in general and assistance to Islamist-dominated 
governments in particular. At the same time, there is private 
ambivalence in the Gulf about the Muslim Brotherhood 
accompanied by sharp public antagonism. After an IMf deal 
is concluded in Egypt, new funds might be made available; 
however, the continuing political maneuvering in Egypt 
increases risk while providing an excuse for hesitation by 
donors. In such an environment, Gulf donors will limit their 
commitments and may seek ways to assist more palatable 
partners in gaining political sway in the transition states. 
Thus, the prospects for a Marshall Plan approach are dim. 
More likely is a prolonged period of economic muddling 
through and political crisis management, with donors and 
investors continuing to play tentative supporting roles. 
Iran Threat Spurring US/Gulf  
Security Ties
finding common denominators in US and Gulf attitudes and 
policies toward the countries in transition will continue to be 
difficult. Locating common ground on regional security poses 
similar challenges. The United States and Gulf states have 
taken some steps to work together, for example in Libya and 
to some degree Syria, but approaches to regional security 
matters are also burdened with uncertainty and ambivalence. 
Since the drawdown of US forces from Iraq, political-military 
cooperation between the United States and its Gulf partners 
has focused on dealing with the threat from Iran. The 
instruments of deterrence include improving the defense 
capabilities of Gulf states, encouraging cooperation on 
defensive systems, and upgrading US-Gulf consultation 
mechanisms. Gulf states have topped the list of buyers of US 
weapons systems for some time6 and these purchases have 
resulted in qualitative superiority of Gulf air forces over their 
Iranian counterpart. Gradual cooperation on defensive 
systems such as radar early-warning is taking place but at a 
painstakingly slow pace, and the issue remains at the forefront 
of the US agenda during consultations with the GCC states.
These consultations took on a new quality during 2012, with 
the creation of the US-GCC Strategic Cooperation forum, 
which enhanced the annual US/GCC foreign Ministers 
meeting with an additional session every six months.7 The 
United States has urged the GCC to include defense officials 
in their delegation in order to foster greater coordination. The 
United States would like to see a more integrated and 
effective GCC structure, particularly in linking GCC defense 
systems, which the US sees as critical to defending against 
Iranian missiles. However, there has been only incremental 
progress and GCC member states jealously protect their 
bilateral ties with the United Sates, and the United States has 
not forced the issue. 
Changing Gulf State Military Role 
outside the Gulf
As the individual members of the GCC improve their 
defenses, some have also begun in recent years to play a 
more active role in security operations outside the Gulf. The 
UAE worked with NATO forces in Afghanistan and Libya. 
Qatar played a large role in supporting the Libya uprising, 
contributing both funds and personnel, participating in NATO 
air attacks, financing opposition figures, and mobilizing 
support at the United Nations. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are 
assisting the opposition in Syria. Motivations for this 
increased engagement are diverse, and at times have been 
rooted in personal animosity towards leaders such as 
Muammar Qaddafi of Libya and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. 
Both the UAE and Qatar want to demonstrate that they can 
punch above their weight in international diplomacy and 
security as part of their international branding campaigns, 
and the UAE also has been eager to demonstrate that it can 
be a capable military partner to the United States, as in 
Afghanistan. Saudi support for the Syrian opposition is widely 
seen as part of the larger objective to reduce Iranian influence 
in the region. 
The out-of-area military actions by selected GCC states do 
not stem from a long-term coherent strategy adopted by 
individual states, much less by the GCC as a whole. They do 
not reflect a unified Gulf view on cooperating with NATO or 
the United States. They certainly do not represent any 
predilection to support broad-based movements against 
one-man or one-family rule. So far, these attempts to project 
6 richard f. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011,” (Congressional research Service), August 24, 2012.
7 See Department of State Media Note, October 1,2012, Joint Communiqué from the Second Ministerial Meeting for the US-GCC Strategic Cooperation forum 
and State Department Briefing on US-GCC Strategic Cooperation forum, September 28, 2012.
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Gulf military power outside the Gulf are based on 
idiosyncratic decisions related to particular circumstances. 
These specific decisions do not imply assumptions of a 
distinct responsibility for ensuring broad regional security in 
the Middle East, either in partnership with the United States 
or on their own. 
In terms of security within the Gulf region itself, Gulf states 
have increased their investment in weapons systems and 
infrastructure in part due to their suspicions of the long-term 
durability of the United States as a security partner. Despite 
the US commitment to provide political and military assets to 
counter Iran, Gulf states worry that the United States could 
reach a grand bargain with Iran that fails to protect their 
interests. They also take seriously the US pivot to Asia and 
what that might mean for future US engagement in the 
Middle East. There is a clear recognition that the United 
States supplies a security umbrella for the Gulf, but one 
academic noted in an off-the-record session that the Gulf 
contribution in the form of bases and capabilities is 
undervalued by the United States. And as another noted, if 
Iran acquired nuclear weapons, Gulf states would feel 
pressure to obtain such capabilities in the Gulf because 
coming under any formal US nuclear umbrella would be 
unacceptable to Gulf public opinion. 
On the surface it would seem easier to define common 
denominators on security issues than on the issues of 
democratic transitions, but in fact both of these files are 
plagued by uncertainty and suspicion. In both cases, there is 
a great need to find common denominators that serve both 
US and Gulf interests for the long-term. 
An Agenda for Establishing  
Common Denominators
Given the continued congruence of interests between the GCC 
states and the United States, and the potential for the Gulf 
states to play an even greater regional and global role, now is 
the time to reexamine the partnership and de-conflict interests 
to the greatest extent possible. If such a dialogue is to result in 
a stronger renewed partnership, it will need to include: 
•	 Developing broad consensus between Gulf states and 
the United States on how to respond to the economic 
needs of the Arab countries in transition. Both sides 
have significant interests at play but they are talking past 
each other. regardless of attitudes toward the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the prospect of Egypt spiraling further into 
economic stagnation is in no one’s interest. finding ways 
to deal with unpredictable change requires clear 
identification of differences and agreement to disagree 
where consensus is not available. 
•	 Coming to agreement that supporting violence and other 
forms of uncompromising extremism, whether from 
al-Qaeda affiliates or other Salafi extremists, is 
dangerous. This issue has the potential to put the United 
States and select Gulf states on a collision course. The 
Gulf and the United States went through a long cycle of 
recrimination after 9/11 that would be exacerbated by a 
body of evidence of official or unofficial support for 
terrorists in the transition states.
•	 Making the wave of change in the region, including its 
manifestations inside Gulf countries, a subject of quiet 
but sustained discussion inside and outside of 
governments on both sides. No such official dialogue is 
taking place in any sustained way, with only fragments of 
limited private approaches finding echo in occasional 
public statements, where nuance is difficult and 
misinterpretation is the norm. Some would claim that 
such conversations represent interference in internal Gulf 
matters, but the minimal requirement for effective US 
foreign and security policy is to avoid surprises that 
could damage US interests. 
•	 Ensuring that any solution to halting Iran’s quest for 
nuclear weapons also takes into account the continuing 
threat to the Gulf from Iran unrelated to weapons of 
mass destruction. failure to do so will play into the 
corrosive narrative that emerged from the Iraq war that 
the United States supported Shia ascendance in order 
to keep Sunnis off balance, and will make it even more 
difficult to work together on projects outside the Gulf. 
•	 Examining in a systematic way what a durable, long-term 
security relationship will require. Key issues for the future 
are currently overtaken by the threat from Iran and steady 
militarization of the Gulf that is seen as favorable to US 
security and business interests. But there is no reason to 
expect this situation to be permanent, and current 
arrangements provide little guidance to policymakers on 
how to work with Gulf allies in addressing the regional 
security aspects of the Syrian civil war, for example. 
Issues related to the US presence in the Gulf itself should 
also be discussed in a broad and comprehensive way 
with the objective toward a long-term durable relationship.
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